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China–Africa Modernization and the SGR Economic Belt

Working paper by Mikhail Nyamweya for the Third Seminar on the Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa. It examines the China–Kenya relationship, infrastructure diplomacy, the Standard Gauge Railway and development as a peacebuilding instrument.

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Working Paper · May 2025 · Source text

WORKING PAPER

Title: China–Africa Modernization and the SGR Economic Belt - Third Seminar on the Outlook on Peace and Development in the Horn of Africa Prepared for: Africa Policy Institute

Author: Mikhail Nyamweya Date: May 2025

I Introduction

Over the last two decades, the China-Kenya (Sino-Kenya) relationship has transitioned from a commercially driven partnership to a strategic, multilayered engagement anchored in infrastructure diplomacy, technology transfer, and geopolitical alignment. One of the most important variations of neo-globalization is China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), launched in 2013, and announced by China President Xi Jinping (Carmody & Murphy, 2022). This placed Kenya and the Horn of Africa at the heart of Africa’s eastward economic connectivity. The Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), envisioned as a modern trade artery, is both a flagship and a symbol of China-Kenya cooperation serving not only as a logistical project but as a platform for broader debates on sovereignty, debt, and national development (Huang & Lesutis, 2023). Increasingly, these conversations are also reframing infrastructure as a peacebuilding instrument, where connectivity and economic transformation are seen as tools for addressing inequality, marginalization, and state fragility. Within the context of Kenya and the greater Horn of Africa, this shift compels us to re-examine what development actually entails and whom it serves, moving beyond growth figures to more significant socio-political outcomes. As such, it is the premise of this paper to shed light on the connection between China-Africa development cooperation and the creation of sustainable peace through infrastructure-led transformation. It argues that Chinese-funded projects, particularly the SGR in Kenya, are not merely economic in intent but strategically foster a development-peace nexus.

Drawing from the postulations of Amartya Sen’s concept of Development as Freedom, this paper positions development as more than material growth but as the expansion of people’s capabilities, the freedom to move, trade, access opportunities, and participate meaningfully in society (Sen, 2001). In this view, freedom itself becomes a foundation for peace, and infrastructure, when inclusive and equitably governed. Through drawing a linkage between marginalized regions and enhancing mobility, projects like the SGR help consolidate national cohesion and reduce spatial inequality. This stands in sharp contrast to Walt Rostow’s (1960) linear stages of economic growth, which frame development as a unidirectional, industrial path culminating in mass consumption, often neglecting social freedoms and political agency (Rostow, 1960). Rostow’s model assumes uniformity and top-down modernization. On the other hand, Sen (2001) framework emphasizes plurality, agency, and the intrinsic value of freedom. In the Kenyan case, development is not about taking off economically, but also about structurally enabling peace through access, participation, and capability expansion.

On the above basis, Ndzendze and Monyae (2019) differentiate between the initial One Belt One Road (OBOR) concept, which implied a singular infrastructure network, and the evolved Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which comprises a multiplicity of interconnected projects and reflects a more inclusive, decentralized development framework. Rooted in China's earlier Going Out strategy, the BRI has incentivized outbound investments as an extension of China’s modernization journey, drawing from the economic liberalization policies initiated by Deng Xiaoping and later consolidated under Xi Jinping’s vision of shared global prosperity (Ndzendze & Monyae, 2019). This outward infrastructural expansion intersects critically with Africa’s own modernization aspirations, particularly under the auspices of the African Union’s Agenda 2063, which emphasizes integrated, continent-wide development and industrialization (African Union, 2015). Projects like the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) in Kenya, forming part of the broader East African Rail Master Plan, exemplify the convergence of China’s global development initiative with Africa’s infrastructural ambitions (Ndzendze & Monyae, 2019). The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) further institutionalizes this alignment, cementing the potential for a China-Africa community of shared future grounded in peace, cooperative development, and the equitable distribution of global public goods (Wu, Alden, & Sidiropoulos, 2017; African Union, 2015).

Following the distinction between China's evolving BRI and Africa’s Agenda 2063 as examined by Ndzendze and Monyae (2019), this paper brings about a focused exploration of China-Africa modernization. Rather than modernization as external intervention, it is approached here in this paper as a co-constructed process shaped by historical legacies, institutional choices, and shared development ambitions. Drawing from Amartya Sen’s (2001) seminal argument that development is the expansion of substantive freedoms, modernization is viewed not simply as industrial or infrastructural advancement but as the transformation of political, economic, and social capabilities that are necessary for people to lead the lives they have reason to value.

This study situates its analysis within the period 2013–2024, using the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) and express way as the point of focus to assess how China-Africa modernization manifests materially and institutionally. The paper centers on three interconnected areas: China's path to modernization and its strategic internationalization, Africa’s own renaissance and homegrown search for alternative models of transformation, and the idea of a China-Africa community of shared future, particularly in how peace, infrastructure, and global public goods are co-negotiated. These will be examined through six interrelated themes: Peace, development, economic corridors versus belts, modernization theory, governance, and the impact of the BRI, with special attention to Kenya and the Horn of Africa at large as well as the role of FOCAC as a diplomatic mechanism. In the end, the SGR is interpreted not really and entirely as a logistical achievement but as a metaphor for the deeper political and normative entanglements of modernization in an emerging multipolar world.

II Conceptual framework

In this context of China-Africa modernization, the concept of peace warrants evaluation. Traditional liberal economics, particularly the Keynesian notion of peace, posits that economic interdependence reduces incentives for conflict, as nations become more invested in mutual growth and stability (Keynes, 1919; 2016). However, this logic is increasingly complicated by the rise of a multipolar global order, where power is not concentrated in Western hegemonies but dispersed among other rising states in the global sphere. In this setting, peace becomes not necessarily about the absence of war and conflict but now more about structural stabilization through developmental institutions and regional diplomacy. This is evident in China's Global Development Initiative (GDI) and its engagements in the Horn of Africa, where peace is constructed not through liberal democratization as viewed in the past, but through security-for-infrastructure bargains and strategic logistics networks (Berhe, 2017). The deployment of infrastructure, such as the SGR and port developments in Djibouti, reflects a logic where peace is delivered via connectivity and controlled development corridors, rather than by promoting participatory governance or liberal institutions (African Union Peace and Security Council, 2017). For instance, Kagwanja (2024) argues in this context that the BRI is predicated on the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence which include mutual respect for each others sovereignty and territorial integrity, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in each others internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful coexistence. Thus, peace in the China-Africa modernization paradigm aligns more closely with a realist-developmentalist model-built on managed stability and reciprocal infrastructure diplomacy.

Equally central is the concept of development, which in its primal context functions as a tool of stabilization, particularly at the continental scale. Recent scholarship on state capitalism and neo-globalization (Carmody & Murphy, 2022) shows how development initiatives led by China are reshaping global integration through hybrid state–market mechanisms. Unlike neoliberal development, which emphasizes market liberalization and deregulation, China's approach, mainly illustrated through the BRI, is state-coordinated and infrastructure-led, especially in regions like East Africa (Otele, 2020). The SGR serves as a prime example and even more than a railway, as it represents the anchoring of Kenya into a new regional political economy governed through sovereign lending, technology transfer, and logistic reconfiguration (Otele, 2020). Its strategic logic lies in spatial stabilization, integrating hinterlands, harmonizing customs zones, and enabling broader regional trade networks that preempt instability (Otele, 2020). In this way, development is not the outcome of modernization, but the infrastructure of modernization itself.

In addition to the three mentioned concepts, is the conceptual distinction between an economic belt and a development corridor. The two terms are often used interchangeably but with markedly different spatial, political, and strategic implications. A development corridor generally refers to a linear infrastructure zone aimed at linking specific economic nodes such as ports, cities, or border points and are mainly for trade facilitation and sectoral development (Were, 2019). These are typically narrow in scope, donor-driven, and often aligned with commodity extraction or export-oriented flows. Examples include the Lobito Corridor (Angola-Zambia), or the Northern Corridor of East Africa. In contrast, an economic belt, as conceptualized in BRI, is wider, multi-scalar, and transformative in ambition. It integrates hard infrastructure (railways, ports, energy systems), soft infrastructure (governance norms, customs integration), and geostrategic influence across multiple sectors and countries (Liu & Dunford, 2016; Tekdal, 2018; Wang, 2016). The Mombasa-Matadi axis and the maritime links through Djibouti, Mombasa, and the Indian Ocean are emblematic of this expansive vision, where transport and trade corridors evolve into strategic geopolitical spaces, reflecting a new form of regional reordering (Lisinge, 2020; Wissenbach, 2019).

While the initial emergence of Djibouti-Addis and Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) qualified the Horn as a corridor, this peculiar distinction hence places the Horn of Africa as an emergent belt or a corridor in transition within the context of China-Africa modernization. The same is largely due to China's investments in regional rail as seen in Mombasa-Nairobi-Naivasha SGR, integrated logistics hub such as the Nairobi Inland Container Depot and expansion of Ethiopia's Modjo Dry Port (Ehizuelen & Abdi, 2018; Wissenbach, 2019; Lisinge, 2020) Moreover, FOCAC’s financing structures and diplomatic mechanisms have institutionalized this transition from bilateral project financing to multilateral modernization diplomacy (Ndzendze & Monyae, 2019; Brautingam & Huang, 2023). Thus, while development corridors serve immediate functional roles, economic belts represent regional integration tools and political imaginaries, carrying with them discourses of shared destiny, policy coordination, and sovereignty-sensitive development (Mohan et al., 2020; Tekdal, 2018). Within this framework, the SGR becomes more than a transport system and is therefore a foundational thread in a broader modernization belt connecting Africa’s interior to the global economy.

Moreover, within the evolving landscape of China-Africa modernization, governance as a concept emerges as an important discussion where differing models of modernity are institutionalized, contested, or hybridized. In classical modernization theory, particularly in the work of Rostow (1960), governance is conceived primarily in technocratic terms. Put differently, it is viewed as a neutral instrument for sequencing economic transformation from traditional to advanced industrial stages. However, this Universalist framing is disrupted by alternative modernization paradigms. Diop (1987) attempted to offer a distinctly African vision of governance, rooted in cultural sovereignty and historical continuity. He argued that African modernization could not be grafted onto imported Western governance models but must draw from indigenous political traditions and civilizational knowledge systems (Diop, 1987). Similarly, Chen Xujing, writing amid China’s own turbulent process of modernization, emphasized that governance should not be synonymous with Westernization. Instead, he envisioned it as a culturally embedded mechanism, capable of integrating institutional rationality with national identity and Confucian administrative legacies (Liu, 2002; Jenco, 2015).

These competing visions converge materially in the China-Africa infrastructure regime, where governance plays both an instrumental and symbolic role. Under the BRI and the FOCAC, governance is no longer merely about public sector management and it becomes a field for negotiating sovereignty, development priorities, and institutional forms. For example, the SGR in Kenya has been implemented through state-to-state compacts and Chinese concessional loans—often sidelining domestic parliaments, bypassing competitive procurement processes, and limiting civic oversight (Onjala, 2018; Wissenbach, 2019). Yet, it also introduces new logics of planning, accountability, and performance-oriented governance. Scholars of state capitalism and neo-globalization argue that this form of governance reflects an emergent transnational regulatory assemblage where hybrid norms are neither fully local nor entirely a Chinese shape of decision-making (Carmody & Murphy, 2022). This therefore means that governance in the China-Africa modernization paradigm cannot be reduced to either technocracy or sovereignty but must be understood as a contested and adaptive space where developmentalist statecraft, civilizational logics, and global infrastructures are co-produced.

In sum, the concepts of China-Africa modernization exemplifies an evolving peace-development nexus, where infrastructure like the SGR serves not only economic functions but also as instruments of regional stability and institutional transformation. While classical models such as Rostow’s (1960) emphasize linear growth, scholars like Diop (1987) and Chen Xujing compel us to view modernization as a culturally embedded and politically adaptive process. Seen through Sen’s (2001) lens of development as freedom, peace and development are not sequential goals but mutually reinforcing conditions that can be realized through negotiated partnerships that aim to secure livelihoods, strengthen governance, and widen the scope of collective agency.

III A China-Africa Community of Shared Future: Peaceful Life through Shared Development and the Distribution of Global Public Goods

The China-Africa modernization project is increasingly framed in the language of a community of shared future, a strategic and normative vision that reflects China's evolving role in global governance and development. This concept finds institutional expression through the BRI, the FOCAC, and infrastructure partnerships such as the SGR. These initiatives are not just economic or diplomatic tools but operate as platforms for the delivery of public goods especially in the absence or retreat of traditional global powers from consistent development engagement in Africa.

Public goods, classically defined, are non-rivalrous and non-excludable services that benefit multiple actors simultaneously. Joseph Nye’s (2015) extension of this definition into the international realm distinguishes between national public goods, produced within borders, and global public goods, which stabilize the global system. Historically, the provision of such goods, from security to trade norms, was associated with hegemonic actors, particularly the United States. Yet, with the erosion of U.S. and European engagement in Africa’s infrastructure and peace architecture, we see signs of what Charles Kindleberger termed a systemic failure of leadership, the Kindleberger Trap, in which no single actor is willing or able to underwrite the necessary goods for global order (Kindleberger, 1973).

China’s engagement in Africa can be seen as a response to this void. Through large-scale projects such as the Djibouti International Free Trade Zone, the Ethiopia-Djibouti Railway, the Mombasa-Nairobi-Naivasha SGR, and the Nairobi Inland Container Depot, China is supplying not only physical assets but also regional public goods. These infrastructures reduce transaction costs, enhance mobility, and support trade integration, all critical to the success of the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). As the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA, 2021) notes, effective implementation of AfCFTA requires seamless infrastructure to connect internal markets. The China-financed SGR, in this light, is more than a railway since it is a piece of connective tissue in Africa’s continental market system.

The logic of peace through development is central to China’s public goods strategy. In contrast to liberal peacebuilding models that focus on institutional reform and democratization, China’s approach in regions such as the Horn of Africa links peace to material stability and logistical security. China’s military base in Djibouti, co-located with massive port investments, exemplifies how it links peace to access and mobility, securing trade routes and ensuring that the development agenda can function uninterrupted.

This framework aligns with Sen’s (2001) notion of development as the expansion of freedoms, not only political, but also economic and social. Peace is not treated as a precondition to development, but rather as something that can be built through development, by reducing inequality in infrastructure access, lowering barriers to intra-African trade, and strengthening the institutional capacities of states to manage connectivity. The Lamu Port-South Sudan-Ethiopia Transport (LAPSSET) Corridor, while still in development, mirrors this vision by seeking to bind fragmented national economies into a broader zone of mutual interdependence.

Yet, while China may be filling some public goods gaps, questions of ownership and agency persist. The SGR in Kenya, though aligned with Vision 2030 and Agenda 2063, has drawn criticism for its opaque financing model, overdependence on Chinese contractors, and bypassing of local governance institutions (Onjala, 2018; Wissenbach, 2019). These concerns echo critiques of earlier dependency models, raising the question: are these public goods truly shared, or are they strategic extensions of Chinese statecraft dressed in multilateral language?

FOCAC seeks to mitigate potential tensions of ownership and agency by promoting, what in common parlance, is known as win-win cooperation but its bilateral financing model often operates outside traditional accountability mechanisms. However, unlike Bretton Woods institutions, China has emphasized non-interference and mutual respect, which has garnered support among African governments seeking alternatives to Western conditionalities (Brautigam, 2009). Still, as Carmody & Murphy (2022) argue, these partnerships often produce variegated outcomes, shaped as much by domestic political settlements as by donor preferences.

More importantly, FOCAC provides the narrative infrastructure for China’s global public goods diplomacy in Africa. It frames Chinese engagement not as geopolitical competition but as part of a shared modernization journey, emphasizing mutual benefit, non-interference, and South–South solidarity (Mwaniki, 2024). By pledging support for infrastructure, trade facilitation, and customs harmonization, FOCAC positions China as a long-term partner in AfCFTA realization and regional integration (Soulé, 2022). At the same time, it blurs the line between public good provision and strategic alignment: China's backing of security coordination in the Horn of Africa, and its growing footprint in digital governance, signal interests that are developmental and strategic (Lendzoumbou, 2024). FOCAC thus helps Africanize China’s development posture while advancing a Chinese-led multilateralism that contrasts with the conditionalities of Western donors.

Despite these complexities, the China-Africa community of shared future offers a compelling alternative to the declining liberal order. One in which public goods provision is pragmatic, infrastructure-led, and materially grounded. Rather than wait for consensus-based multilateralism, China has advanced a model of developmental peace that centers infrastructure as a stabilizing force. In doing so, it enables African regionalism not necessarily in rhetorical terms alone, but through the creation of corridors, ports, and railway systems that make AfCFTA a spatial and economic possibility.

Still, the future of this model will depend on whether these goods evolve toward true regional ownership. Projects like the SGR have shown that African states can leverage external capital for internal goals, but they must also push for greater transparency, skill transfer, and institutional inclusion (Alden & Otele, 2022). In this particular regard, peace, development, and modernization cannot be decoupled but must be co-constructed through deliberate cooperation, with African actors asserting their agency not only as recipients, but as co-creators of the public goods they need (Alden & Otele, 2022).

The SGR as one of the most prominent China-financed infrastructure projects in Africa, stands at the center of this modernization-public goods nexus. It offers a concrete case for examining how shared development goals are translated into built form, how peace and economic integration are materially stitched together, and how China-Africa relations are experienced at the intersection of state vision and everyday mobility. The following section assesses the SGR’s impacts on governance, regional trade, and the realization of AfCFTA objectives.

IV Impacts of Kenya's SGR - a flagship project under Kenya's Vision 2030, the country's development blueprint

Building on the broader vision of a China-Africa community of shared future where peace, development, and public goods converge. The SGR stands as a material expression of this partnership and a key case for evaluating the practical implications of China-led modernization in Africa. As Mwaniki (2024) notes, infrastructure projects under the BRI and FOCAC framework serve dual roles. One, he notes that they function as developmental assets and second, as geopolitical instruments for shaping new regional orders (Mwaniki, 2024). The SGR, launched in 2013 and backed by Chinese financing and contractors, not only encapsulates this kind of duality but also provides an ideal lens through which to assess the multifaceted impacts of modernization. This section therefore examines the economic, environmental, social, geostrategic, and regional integration impacts of the SGR in Kenya, reflecting how a single infrastructure project can reconfigure spatial relations, livelihoods, and diplomatic alignments in the Global South.

(i) Economic Impact

One of the major economic goals of the SGR was to catalyze industrialization by improving the movement of goods across key economic zones. Beyond providing a safer and faster transport system for freight and passenger services, the SGR has had significant impacts on job creation and economic activity. During construction of the first phase, the China Road and Bridge Corporation (CRBC) reported creating over 30,000 jobs for Kenyans. In 2017, upon completion of Phase I, CRBC signed an operations, maintenance, and service agreement with Kenya Railways Corporation (KRC), which included a technology transfer component and training of local railway professionals (Huang & Lesutis, 2023).

The SGR has also stimulated growth in previously remote or underdeveloped areas, with towns like Voi in Taita-Taveta County experiencing a surge in economic activity during construction (Wissenbach & Wang, 2017). By enabling faster movement of raw materials from the Port of Mombasa to inland industrial zones like Nairobi, Naivasha, and Athi River, the SGR supports the development of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). These hubs create opportunities for local businesses and generate employment in areas that previously had very limited economic activity.

In sectors like agriculture, speed and reliability are crucial, and the SGR offers both. Local farmers benefit from the ability to move produce more quickly, improving earnings and reducing spoilage. The efficiency of cargo transport has dramatically improved: according to Irandu and Owilla (2020), the SGR shortened the travel time between Mombasa and Nairobi and reduced freight costs by up to 79%. The project is expected to lower Kenya’s logistics costs by 40%, improving industrial competitiveness and easing the cost of doing business.

For passengers, the railway has cut travel time between Mombasa and Nairobi from over ten hours to just four (Huang & Lesutis, 2023). This has significantly improved economic interactions between the two cities, allowing people to run cross-county operations more efficiently. It has also unlocked potential for tourism within Kenya and East Africa. Since SGR operations began, travel between Mombasa and Nairobi became faster and more predictable, allowing people to better plan their journeys. This has led to a notable increase in the number of domestic tourists, helping to diversify the client base of the tourism industry (Zhu et al., 2022).

Regionally, the SGR plays a major role in enhancing Kenya’s position as a trade and logistics hub. By streamlining cargo movement from Mombasa to landlocked countries such as Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and South Sudan, and with proposed connections to the DRC and Ethiopia, the railway improves regional trade corridors like the Mombasa–Nairobi–Malaba line and the LAPSSET corridor. This has the potential to boost Kenya’s GDP by 1.5%, underlining the importance of railway infrastructure in national economic growth (Irandu & Owilla, 2020).

(ii) Ecological Impact

The SGR is categorized as a National Class I railway and has a wide range of safety protection measures in the design and operation that include speed limits, installation of high guard fence, safety buffers and earth embankments to avoid crossing other infrastructures (Nyumba et al., 2021).

The Mombasa–Nairobi SGR Project Department, according to CRBC (2016), adheres to the environmental values of “love, respect, compliance, protection” and follows the policy of “complete system, clear responsibility, and close supervision.” The project integrates environmental protection into its design, management, and construction, aiming to make the Mombasa-Nairobi SGR a “road of green development.”

Practical efforts to reduce environmental harm include measures to prevent soil erosion, especially in vulnerable zones. The SGR passes through Tsavo National Park, Nairobi National Park, and other wildlife areas, and in these locations, bridges, underpasses, culverts, and flyovers have been constructed to ensure the free movement of wildlife. In high human density areas like Athi River, similar infrastructure allows for safe and unobstructed movement of people. Within Nairobi National Park, an acoustic noise barrier has been installed to reduce disturbance to wildlife. (Nyumba et al., 2021b). This reflects a significant attempt to balance human development with ecological preservation, and shows investment in wildlife protection and environmentally conscious infrastructure. Beyond construction, the railway also brings long-term benefits such as increased train use means fewer trucks on the roads, which contributes to reduced carbon emissions and lower environmental degradation over time.

(iii) Social Impact

The SGR is instrumental in enhancing people-to-people connections both within Kenya and with the wider East African region. By developing infrastructure to bridge counties quickly and efficiently, the SGR serves as a structural backbone for socio-economic inclusivity. Currently, the Kenyan Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) project from Mombasa to Naivasha has significantly improved transportation accessibility, reducing travel time and increasing domestic mobility and interaction (Zhu et al., 2022).

One of the notable outcomes of such infrastructure is the promotion of local tourism. The SGR has contributed to a surge in domestic tourism, especially to new destinations such as Suswa and traditional parks like Tsavo. Local tour operators, hoteliers, and small vendors experienced growth due to increased internal travel facilitated by efficient rail transport. The number of Kenyan adult citizens visiting national parks rose by approximately 30% from 2015 to 2019, directly aligning with the period of SGR construction and operation (Zhu et al., 2022).

Moreover, infrastructure projects like SGR and LAPSSET result in the emergence of new settlements, towns, and urban centers. For instance, the growth of Voi and Suswa is a direct outcome of enhanced railroad connectivity, with new businesses, housing developments, and social services emerging to accommodate increased economic activity and population mobility (Zhu et al., 2022). This urban transformation has also enabled the development of cultural diversity and unique art, including architectural styles that blend modern design with local cultural elements. In Suswa, for example, there is a visible shift toward modern lifestyles, with traditional Maasai cultural art being adapted into tourism-related products, such as beadwork and themed dining experiences. This illustrates a broader pattern of infrastructure-induced cultural integration and diversity preservation, as communities respond to economic opportunities while retaining elements of their identity.

(iv) Regional Connectivity

Kenya positions itself as a regional hub within East Africa and as a critical connector between the continent and global trade networks. Infrastructure development has been a major focus for the East African Community (EAC), and Kenya has played a central role in driving regional integration through projects like the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR), cross-border roads, and regional energy interconnections. (Kiyoshi & Gichuki, 2020)

The LAPSSET is a key regional infrastructure project that aims to improve connectivity between EAC member states, reducing transport costs and cutting down the time it takes to move goods across borders. This is especially important for landlocked countries like Uganda, Rwanda, and Burundi, who rely on Kenya’s infrastructure, particularly the Port of Mombasa and the SGR, to access global markets. Improved infrastructure strengthens regional supply chains, making it easier for businesses to get their goods to market faster and more efficiently. At the same time, it positions Kenya as a key player in shaping the future of intra-African trade, especially as the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) continues to take shape. (Kiyoshi & Gichuki, 2020).

(v) Regional Integration

The idea of a more connected Africa is starting to come together through regional efforts like the East African member states' infrastructure developments projects such as the SGR. The “One Africa” movement is part of a broader goal to build a stronger sense of regional identity and unity, which can be further supported by easier travel and trade. Several East African leaders have shown real commitment to advancing integration, and the recent admission of the DRC into the EAC is one example of how the region is expanding both its political influence and economic opportunities. At the same time, the EAC has made efforts to create a stable environment for this kind of cooperation to happen. The East African Standby Force (EASF) is one of the key initiatives that aims to strengthen the region’s ability to respond to conflict and insecurity (Rwigema, 2024). These kinds of security frameworks are necessary if the region is going to move forward with any serious long-term development.

But the goals of regional integration and economic cooperation won’t be met unless the region also addresses its infrastructure gaps. Projects like LAPSSET are a good example of how this is already happening. The LAPSSET corridor is designed to link Kenya, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, reaching an estimated 160 million people, and helping to open up trade across borders. It’s also part of a bigger plan to eventually connect the Indian Ocean to the Atlantic, from Lamu Port to Douala Port in Cameroon to connect the East to the West of Africa (Celestin, Rwigema, 2024). Similar dynamics are visible in Matadi, Democratic Republic of Congo, where port modernization and transport corridors financed through China–Africa cooperation have repositioned local economies within international shipping routes and revitalized cross-border exchange (Lendzoumbou, 2024). In this context, the SGR serves not only as a freight infrastructure but also as a social enabler, connecting Kenyan citizens to broader regional and global circuits of commerce and mobility.

Conclusion

Taken together, the SGR is more than a flagship transport project since it is a crystallization of the deeper logics behind China-Africa modernization, where infrastructure serves as both the material and symbolic foundation for a new model of growth, peace, and regional integration. Anchored in frameworks such as FOCAC, aligned with continental goals like AfCFTA, and embedded in a shifting global order marked by the Kindleberger Trap, the SGR illustrates how Africa’s infrastructure ambitions are increasingly co-produced through strategic partnerships that offer alternatives to conditional aid and Western development orthodoxy. It reflects not only Kenya’s national vision under Vision 2030, but also a broader continental pursuit of modernization that is rooted in mobility, sovereignty, and shared prosperity. As this paper has shown, the SGR’s impacts which are economic, social, environmental, and regional speak to the transformative power of infrastructure when it is tied to a coherent modernization strategy that is African in aspiration and global in reach.

Recommendations (Specify to whom recommendation is directed to)

In light of the transformative role of the SGR and its larger implications for China-Africa modernization, the following recommendations are proposed to maximize its long-term impact while aligning with Kenya’s national development goals and Africa’s regional integration agenda:

1. Deepen Integration with the AfCFTA Framework: Kenya should position the SGR not only as a national asset but as a backbone for facilitating the AfCFTA. This requires harmonizing customs procedures, cargo handling systems, and border regulations with neighboring states to ensure the railway enables seamless cross-border trade and mobility across East and Central Africa.

2. Institutionalize Regional Planning under FOCAC and AU Mandates: To avoid fragmented development, Kenya and its regional partners should advocate for more multilateral infrastructure coordination under FOCAC and the African Union’s Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA). This would shift projects like the SGR and LAPSSET from bilateral investments to continental public goods supported by shared governance structures.

3. Strengthen Local Content and Skill Transfer Provisions: While Chinese financing and technical input have been crucial, it is essential that Kenya enforces stronger local content rules, ensuring capacity building, technology transfer, and employment generation for Kenyan citizens thereby embedding modernization within domestic human capital development.

4. Expand Social Connectivity Beyond Freight and Tourism: Building on the social gains already observed such as rising domestic tourism and emerging secondary towns—the SGR can be expanded through feeder transport systems, community stations, and affordable passenger services that deepen its integration into the national social fabric and promote more equitable access.

5. Institutionalize Environmental Sustainability in Future Phases: Kenya’s proactive measures, including wildlife underpasses and noise barriers, should be standardized and enhanced in future SGR extensions. An independent environmental monitoring unit should be established to ensure long-term ecological sustainability and public transparency.

6. Advance Regional Diplomacy Around Shared Infrastructure: Kenya should leverage its strategic position as a gateway state to champion East African regionalism, using the SGR as a diplomatic tool to foster peaceful economic interdependence. Aligning with China's Global Development Initiative, this can also advance African-led stabilization in fragile border regions through development-first strategies.

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